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Euthanasia and B iathanasia: 
On Dying and Killing 
David W . Louisell 
Introduction: The Nature 
of the Dilemma 
Not long ago one of the country"s 
great financ ial ho uses sponsnred a 
te levision show called ··The Very 
Personal Death o f E lizabe th Schell 
Ho lt-Hartford." It starkly drama-
tized one of the saddest phases o f 
the human condition , perhaps es-
pecially cruel quantitatively and 
quali tatively in o ur gene ration: the 
lo neliness, sense of uselessness and 
abando nme nt, and bitte rness o f 
many o ld people. The subjec t of 
Proj"essor Louise//. a member o/ 
the Linacre £di10ria/ ad1•iso ty 
board. is the Elizabeth Josselyn 
Boalt Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of California La w School in 
Be rke ley. His article was original~'' 
delivered as the . 1972 Pope John 
XXJJJ lecture at the Catho lic Uni-
versitv ol America. Ai his request. 
we p~tbii:sh this article as delivered 
with all of the nuances arising out 
of the delicate ethical distinctions 
drawn. 
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the story was a lady living 
who had been d ivorced and 
died a t the age o f 82, lea' 
known survivo rs. She o ft en 
o f her dire need for, but I< 
human companio nship. The 
o f her unhappiness can aim 
to uc hed fro m he r own wo 
·' It's such a grim life; th 
thing yo u can do is to bear 
someone shoots you." Her 
cian te lls her , " Yo u do not 
wha t is on the o ther s ide'" a1 
answers "Wha t I know is l this 
side a nd l don't want any n ··e of 
it." That she remains ratim• and 
indeed intellectua l even aft she 
broke he r hip and was imm~ ·l ized 
- po inting o ut for exam pl that 
she kno ws she is lucky co1 Mecl 
to the aged poverty-strid n of 
India - seems only to exat rbate 
the tragedy by emphasizir the 
fe lt pain . 
At the beginning the an nl IJ ncer 
had sa id: ··Because of the set ~ i tive 
na ture o f this program (the sp· nsor) 
has re linqu ished a ll com n,c:rcial 
messages." But its generous im-
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pulses had little counte rpa rt in 
the public~s reaction , wh ic h evi-
denced a bitterness not unli ke tha t 
of Mrs. H olt-Hartford's own dec lin-
ing years. In a wo rd, the sponsor 
was c harged with advocating eutha-
nasia. The reactions ranged fro m 
the frenetic to the thoughtful, one 
writer po inting out that what was 
reprehensible about the program 
was (according to his interpreta-
tion) that the only solutio n to the 
problem of old age that was sug-
gested was euthanasia. One who 
did no t view the program will with-
hold appraisal of the accuracy of 
this essentially artistic judgment 
of .the theme. The interesting thing 
for our purposes w~s the universal 
use of the word "euthanasia" to 
characterize that theme. Yo u have 
advocated e uthanasia , and eutha-
nasia is murder! 
Had I been privy to the reactions 
to "The Very Personal Death of 
Elizabeth Schell Ho lt-Hartford" 
when the facl.\lty invited me to de-
live r the Po pe John XXIII lecture 
this year, I wonder whethe r 1 wo uld 
have had the fortitude to persevere 
with a title using "Eutha nasia." 
Yet, in its precise mea ning. '"eu-
thaneasia" is the desideratum of 
religion as well as o f any mo rally 
or ethically based socia l policy that 
has to do with death. Coming from 
the Greek words meaning "good" 
and "death", it specifies the kind 
of a death that must be as much 
the ideal o f the mora l theologian 
as it is of the philosopher and 
secular humanist - a happy death. 
Yet its corruption seems as perva-
sive in popular usage generally as 
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apparently it was amo ng the reac-
tors to "The Very Pe rsonal Death 
o f Elizabeth Schell Holt-Hartford .'' 
It has come to mean the deliberate. 
intended putting to death painless-
ly of o ne human perso n by another, 
the willed terminatio n of human 
life, which is a euphemism for mur-
der as defined by our law. It would 
have been better to adhere to the 
original meaning o f "euthanasia" 
and use another word, pe rhaps "bi-
athanasia" for delibe rate, affi rma-
tive killing in the mercy-death con-
text. But so pervasive and un iversal 
is the te rmino logical corruption 
that scholars, too, seem to have re-
linquished any notion of restor ing 
original usage and have accepted 
the modern meaning o f euthanasia. 
T hus Professor Arthur J. Dyck, in 
using "euthanasia" in the modern 
sense, would adopt as a synonym 
for its origi na l meaning the Latin 
expression, benemortasia. 2 
The Definitional Problem: 
Voluntary and Involuntary 
Euthanasia 
Taking "eutha nasia", in accor-
dance with modern usage, to mean 
deli berate , intentio nal painless 
killing is only the beginning of the 
definitiona l problem. Do we mean 
to include such a killing o nly when 
it is sought and requested by the 
euthanatee, or also one imposed 
upon him without regard to his 
consent - the e limination of defec-
tive o r hopelessly ill or senile per-
sons, for example, H itler's "useless 
eaters"? In a word, d o we mean only 
voluntary, o r a lso involuntary, eu-
thanasia? 
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On the surface, the dichotomy 
would appear clean-cut. If so, the 
precise thinker would have cause 
to resent the countering of argu-
ment for o r against voluntary eutha-
nasia, with argument pertinent only 
to the involuntary kind. For exam-
ple, during the debate on the 1936 
bill in Parliament for voluntary 
e uthanasia, one of the promine nt 
pro ponents invoked two dramatic 
and appealing cases, one where a 
man had drowned his four year old 
daug hter who had contracted tube r-
culosis and had develobed gangre ne 
on the face, the other where a wo m-
an had killed her mother who was 
suffe ring from general paralysis 
of the insane. Obviously these were 
instances of compulsory. o r in vol-
untary, e uthanasia, yet, although 
the propo nent acknowledged that 
the cases were not covered by the 
proposed bill for voluntary e utha-
nasia, they were the o nly specific 
cases he described.a 
Digging a bit below the surface 
of the voluntary-involuntary di-
c hotomy may render the purist 
more understanding of the ·reasons 
for the confusion a nd more to le r· 
ant of the confused. A page of his-
tory may again be worth a chapter 
o f linguis tic analysis. 
Among some primitive people 
the abandonme nt or killing of the 
aged or helpless apparently was an 
accepted practice. The Hottentots 
carried the ir e lderly parents into 
the bush to die. The Lapp who be-
came too infirm to trek over the 
mo unta ins with their families were 
left behind to die unattended, the ir 
frozen corpses to be buried o n 
the family's return. But it is easy 
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to overly generalize about cw ms 
of euthanasia among primitive 'or 
many societies have actually en 
shown to have had elaborate l les 
protective of their senio r men rs. 
"Instances of this are seen in ho 
tality custo ms, property rights, r, 
taboos reserving certain cho ice dis 
fo r the aged (ostensibly as harn· 
to the young) and o ther usages. "4 
Doubtless the settled agricul ·al 
communities showed the ~ est 
level of solic itude for the el ; ly, 
as witness the laws of the He : :ws 
in the Old Testament forbi ing 
the killing of the innocent an ' LJ St. 
In classical Greece there do L not 
seem to have been abandonm· t of 
elderly or helpless adults. Of <. trse 
in ancient Ro me, largely undt the 
influence of the Stoics, suicid was 
a n accepted form of death as es-
cape from disgrace at the hat ·, of 
an enemy, as indeed it wa1. ntil 
recently at least in Japan und. the 
form o f hara-kiri. Yet Cicero .vho 
had written: "The God that ules 
within us forbids us to depart i. ·nee 
unbidden" abided his com • tion 
and declin ed to play the· "R man 
fool" when pursued to death l • 1 he 
re venge of Antony.5 Jewish , ( hris-
tian and Is lam ic teachings ,dik e 
have always maintained th a de-
liberate killing in case o f abn ~> mal-
ity or incura ble illness is wrong T he 
appare nt exceptio n in St. T h lmas 
Moore 's Utopia is often ove r read 
to imply his personal endorsemcnt.6 
The modern inte rest in eu thana-
sia is usually date d from the I ~70's 
but the formal movement d id not 
begin in Britain until the 1930.!-> with 
the organization in 1935 or the 
g roup now known as the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society. The fi rst bill 
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on euthanasia was bro ught befo re 
ttie United Kingdom Parlia ment in 
1936. It required for e ligibility fo r 
euthanasia that the patient be over 
twenty-one years of age, be suffe r-
ing from an incurable and fa tal ill-
ness, and sign a form in the pre-
sence of two witnesses asking to be 
put to death. It embraced rela tively 
complicated legal proceedings in-
cluding investigation by a e uthana-
sia referee and a hearing before a 
special court. In 1950 the re was 
further debate in the House o f 
Lords on a motion in favo r o f vol-
untary euthanasia.7 
The distinguished legal scholar 
and specialist in criminal law, Pro-
fessor Glanville Willia ms, realizing 
the practical necessity of coun ter-
ing the contention that too much 
formality in the sick room would 
destroy the doc tor-pati e nt relat ion,s 
in his classic The Sanctity of Life 
and the Criminal La w9 proposed a 
simple formula quite diffe rent from 
the 1936 attempt. He suggested the 
uncomplicated provisio n that no 
medical practitioner sho uld be guil-
ty of an offense in respect o f an 
act done intentio nally to accelerate 
the death o f a patient who is seri -
ously ill , unless it is proved that the 
act was not do ne in good faith and 
for the purpose o f saving him from 
severe pain in an illness believed to 
be of an incurable and fatal charac-
ter. to This was the basis o f the 1968 
· draft bill which, with changes, was 
debated in the Lo rds in 1969. The 
most recent parlimentary euthana-
sia debate was in the Ho use of Com-
mons in April , 1970, on a motion 
for leave to introduce a bill.ll No 
statute has been e nacted. 
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The Euthan.asia Society of Ameri-
ca was constituted in 1938 and a 
bill, following the 1936 British mod-
el, was introduced that year in the 
Nebraska Assembly but lost. A simi-
lar a ttempt fa iled in the New Yo rk 
Assembly.12 "The Euthanasia So-
c ie ty of America had at first pro-
posed to advocate the compulsory 
'euthanasia' o f monstrosities and 
imbeciles, but as a result of replies 
to a questionnaire add ressed to 
physicians in the State of New York 
in 1941, it decided to limit itself 
to propaganda for volunta ry e utha-
nasia."13 To what extent the pur-
po rted restriction of recent eu-
thanasia efforts to the voluntary 
kind , is a fun ction of the euthana-
s ia o f Nazi Germany and revela-
tions of the Nuremberg trials , is 
a matter for speculation.t4 In any 
event, there is today no country in 
the wo rld whose law permits eu-
thanasia ei ther of the voluntary or 
involuntary type. French and Swiss 
permissiveness whereby a physi-
c ian may provide, but may not ad-
minister, poison at the request of 
a dying patient, is to be distin-
guished.15 
Some Difficulties 
In view of the fac ial restric tion 
of the current euthanasia move-
me nt to the voluntary type, why in 
the argument over it does confu-
sio n persist as to what precisely is 
being proposed. Why has Glanville 
Williams protested: 
T he !English Society's! bill Jdehated 
in ·Lords in 1936 and 19501 excluded 
any question of compulsory eutha-
nasia. even fo r hopelessly defective 
infants. Unfortunately , a legislali ve 
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proposa l is not assured of success 
merely because it is worded in a stu· 
diously moderate and restrictive form. 
The method of attack, by those who 
dislike the proposal, is to use the '"thin 
edge of the wedge" argument ... 
There is no proposal for reform of 
any topic, however conciliatory and 
moderate, that cannot be opposed by 
this dialectic.16 
At least several observations a re 
pertinent in expla nation of the per-
sisting terminological confusion. 
Some perhaps pertain only to sub-
jective appraisal of the good faith 
o f discussants, but others seem to 
proceed from the reality that, in-
trinsically, voluntary euthanasia is 
not as severable from the involun-
tary as the clean-cut verbal distinc-
tion suggests. 
First, the problem of the rights 
of minors always lurks to compound 
the difficulti es of human forays in-
to life-death decisions unless appli-
cation to mi"nors is explicitly pre-
cluded. Normally decisions respect-
ing serious medical procedures on 
mino rs must await parental or guar-
dian approval, altho ugh historically 
there have been exceptions for 
emergencies and now further ex-
ceptions under the impetus of per-
missive abortion laws. If euthanasia 
is right, should it be withheld from 
an intelligent and knowledgeable 
minor, say one of a n age whose 
judgment would be highly pertinent 
to judicial decision respecting child 
custody in divorce-cases? And if the 
minor and parent differ. on accelera-
tion of the former's death, whose 
judgment controls? Confronted 
with this dilemna, apparently the 
best that Glanville Williams could 
do in The Sanctity of Life and the 
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Criminal Law, was: "The use at 
may be made of my proposed r ·a-
sure (euthanasia) in respect of m-
tients who are mino rs is best ·ft 
to the good sense of the doctor. k· 
ing into accou nt, as he always d -!S. 
the wishes of the parents as ..:11 
as those of the child."17 Those s ·p-
Lical about the vagaries and n m· 
losity of judicial "discretion" •ill 
take note!l8 
Secondly, by definit ion vc un· 
tary euthanasia would be avai ble 
only to those who freely, ir• ·IIi-
gently and knowingly reque) it. 
T his presupposes n1ental co pe-
te nce. Might the test-of compe l 1ce 
be as intangible and uncertai as, 
in a given case, it may be in re .ect 
of execution of a will ; or co• ni t· 
ment as potentially dangerou or 
responsibility for criminal COi luct 
- whether under the M'Nagh n,19 
Durham,2° Model Penal C. le,21 
or d iminished responsibility 1 -;t;22 
or capacity to stand trial.23 T l : de· 
termination of competence •ight 
be in a context even more mer· 
gent and difficult than that hich 
exists for conventional deter n ina· 
tions, and the significance of ~rror 
even more dire, that is, irreve sible. 
Moreover difficulties might and 
perhaps typically would be. com· 
po unded by the inhibition o free 
choice inherent in subjection to 
pain-killing drugs.24 
Thirdly, quite independently of 
the effect of narcotics on con· 
sciousness, pain itself, the toxic 
effects of disease, a nd the reper· 
cussions o f surgical procedures may 
substantially undermine the capac· 
ity for rational and independent 
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. thought. As Professor Yale Kamisar 
asks: " If .. . a man in this plight 
(throes of serious pain o r disease) 
were a c riminal defendant and he 
were to decline the assistance of 
counsel would the courts hold that 
he had 'intelligently and under-
standingly waived the benefit of 
counsel'?''25 Would a confession 
made in such circumstances be 
admissible? 
Fo urthly, what of the proposed 
euthanatee who is unable to com-
municate for himself, for example 
the vic tim of lasting coma? Wo uld 
another, possibly a spouse o r next 
of kin, be presumed to be a compe-
tent speaker for him ? Those who 
have inquired into the a u thority of 
one to bear for another the de-
cisio nal burden in the more con-
ventional medical dilemmas (such 
for example where the doctrine of 
informed consent may req uire that 
information about a dangerous pro-
cedure be given the pat ie nt which 
he is psychologically unable to 
bear, and the physician instead 
speaks with the spouse) know how 
diffic ul t it is to construct a n ade-
quate juridical basis fo r place-
ment of the patient's burden of 
decision on another. even a loving 
spouse.26 After all , an adult under 
no legal disability has no natural 
guardian. The 1969 British bill per-
. haps avoids this dilemna at least in 
part by p roviding that a declara-
tion fo r euthanasia shall come into 
force 30 days after being made, 
shall remain in force, unless re-
voked, for three years , a nd a de-
claratio n re-executed within the 12 
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months preceding its expiry date 
shall remain ·in force , unless re-
voked, during the lifetime of the 
declarant.27 Even so, the problem 
of the continuing effectiveness of 
a declaration , during for example 
the declarant's long coma with for 
instance a spouse claiming its re-
vocation might raise - but in an 
even more psychologically trauma-
tic context - the afore-suggested 
impo nderables of a life-death de-
c ision made by one for another. 
Lastly, Glanville Williams' re-
sentment of the "thin edge of the 
wedge" opposition to e uthanasia, 
however justified in the abstract, 
loses cogency in the actual context 
of the movement's strategy and tac-
tics. I submit that Yale Kamisar 
has convincingly demonstrated that 
the movement's purpose and meth-
od substantially has been utilization 
of the "wedge" principle.28 My con-
viction in this regard has been for-
tified by my persona l o bservations 
of how effectively the "wedge" prin-
ciple has been used in the move-
ment to permissive abortion . I have 
heard the public protests of the 
proponents "All we want is this 
moderate statute" (as they charac-
terized the California one, permit-
ti ng abortion when the mother's 
physical or mental heal th is threat· 
ened and in case of felo nious sex-
ual assault)29 "give us this a nd we 
will ask no more." But I heard them 
simultaneously boasting privately: 
"Just wait till the door is o pened. 
and our foot is in it !" The boast 
was not an idle one. A physician 
has drawn a meaningful parallel: 
" I don 't think that human con-
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scio usness and psychology as it 
exists in our society today could . 
tolerate euthanasia. Yet 20 years 
ago our society wouldn' t have tol-
erated extensive abortion . Our 
mo res c hange."30 
The " thin edge of the wedge" 
danger is real; the camel's nose does 
get under the tent; once opened, 
the movement of the door to death 
by human choice may be a con-
stantly widening, and likely a 
never narrowing, movement. It 
seems pe rtinent to remember that 
the Hitlerian eugenic euthanasia, 
the e limination of "useless eaters," 
whic h preceded his wholesale racial 
genocide, was supported by "hu-
manitarian" petitio ns to him by 
parents of malformed children re-
questing authority for "mercy 
deaths." It is perhaps the supreme 
irony that at first Jews were appar-
ently excluded from the program 
on the ground that they did not 
deserve the benefit of psychiatric 
euthanasia!31 
Is the distinction between volun· 
tary and involuntary euthanasia as 
meaningful and abiding as its facile 
verbal formulation would suggest? 
But let us take the proponents at 
their present word, and limit out 
discussion chiefly to so-called "vol· 
untary" euthanasia.32 And let us 
work with a definition of voluntary 
euthanasia that puts the affirmative 
case in the strongest possible terms, 
as I believe Professo r Kamisar's 
definition does in ·assuming: 
A person ... in fact ( I ) presently in· 
curable, (2) beyond the aid of any 
respite which may come along in his 
life expectancy, suffering (3) intol-
erable and (4) unmitigatable pain 
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and of a (5) fixed and (6) ratio• 
desire to die .. _33 
But before applying that d efi r on 
to o ur problem, a few more re· 
liminary delineations a re in 1 fe r. 
More Definitional Problen 
(i) Euthanasia v. Extraordin y 
Means to Preserve Life :. 
( ii) Euthanasia v. Alleviati 
of Pain by Drugs 
In the word "euthanasia" do 
not include - a nd I subm it hat 
one who struggles for prec ise >m-
munication should not inclut 
the withholding of . extraon' ary 
means to preserve life . To cal the 
mere withholding of extraord ..try 
means " indirect voluntary e tha-
nasia" is I submit, taking int ac· 
count the currently accepted r an· 
ing of "euthanasia" as delib ate 
killing , a confusion of term~ hat 
cannot conduce to precisi<' of 
thought.34 Putting aside for the 
moment the difficulties in ade" ate-
ly a rticulating the differenc, be-
tween "extraordinary" :md · 1rdi· 
nary" means of preserving li ft- the 
soundness of the distinction in ;)rin-
ciple becomes a part of my nain 
thesis today. If the distinctio; be-
tween affirmative killing and IL! ting 
die is only a quibble, as some have 
characterized it,35 my thesis a ils. 
The student of this problem. es-
pecially one innured to common-
law thinking, must be careful lest 
he assimilate the "extraordinary" 
- "ordinary" means distinction to 
our law's classic d ifferentiation be-
tween "action" and "inaction". The 
common law's notion that despite 
the relative ease of rescue a strang-
Linacre Quanerly 
er may safely ignore a person in 
· dire predicament - a d rowning 
child, fo r . example - whereas if 
he acts St. Luke's Good Samaritan 
role and undertakes· rescue he is 
held to the standard of due care ,36 
does not govern in the typical appli-
cation of the "extraordinary" -
"ordinary" means distinction. Un-
der the common law rule (which by 
no means is universally accepted)37 
a physician may refuse aid to the 
stranger-victim of an emergency 
without incurring legal liabili ty, 
however morally reprehensible his 
abstenance may be , while in volun-
tarily rendering aid he incurs the 
obligation of using due care.38 The 
way this caused Good Samaritan 
statutes, exculpating the physic ian 
who follows his conscience rather 
than his convenience, to sweep the 
country like prairie fire, is a story 
I have tried to tell elsewhere39 and 
need not detain us here. 
The important point for present 
purposes is that the attending phy· 
sician is of course not a volunteer ; 
he is bound to the standards of 
medical p erformance, including af-
firmative acts, under the sanction 
of malpractice liability, besides oth-
er sanctions. Thus an attending 
physician's attempted justification 
for failure to fulfill the standards 
of medical practice, on the sole 
ground that his failure was "inac-
tion" rather than "affirmative ac-
tion" would be prepostero us.40 But 
I shall attempt to show that a fail-
ure to use "extraordinary" or "hero· 
ic" means is a different matter a nd , 
in a given context, may be both 
legally and morally justifiable, or, 
November, 1973 
indeed, perhaps even morally ob· 
ligatory. 
Similarly, I maintain that the use 
of drugs to alleviate pain, even 
though that use in fact may hasten 
death, is not "euthanasia" in the 
modern meaning of direct, deliber-
ate killing, because even if in both 
cases death may be "willed" in 
the sense of desired, there is a dif-
ference in means of abiding sig-
nificance in the realities of the 
human condition. Thus I think a 
provision in the British euthanasia 
bill of 1969 works a disservice to 
clarity of analysis when it couples 
a provision authorizing true eutha-
nasia with one declaring that a pa· 
tient suffering from an irremediable 
condition reasonably thought in 
his case to be terminal shall be 
entitled to the administrat ion of 
whatever quantity of drugs may be 
required to keep him free from 
pain .41 I submit there is no serious 
practical question of the present 
legality of such use of drugs42 nor 
any genuine problem with its ethi· 
cality.43 Daniel Maguire's recent 
question equating "positive action" 
and "calculated benign neglect" has 
a similar defect, although in his 
instance there is at least the justi· 
fica tion of an ensuing explicit con· 
frontation with the question's in-
nuendo.44 
Whether my conclusion that it 
is ethical for the physician to ad· 
minister drugs to alleviate pain even 
to an extent that may shorten life 
is any more viable than the prin· 
c iple of double effect, . or whether 
indeed that principle is enough to 
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sustain the distinction, let us put 
aside for the moment. But I should 
candidly note here that I am no t 
amo ng those inclined to emphasize 
the moral value of pain . Sometimes 
the writers, particularly some of 
the more ancient theologians, seem 
a lmost to be arguing that it is, after 
a ll , human suffering tha t makes 
this the best of all possible worlds! 
Amidst such mock heroics it is re-
freshing to turn to the common 
sense of Pius XII who in his Febru-
ary , 1957 address to the Italian anes-
thesio logists, after pointing o ut 
that the growth in the love of God 
does not come from suffering itself 
but from the intention of the will , 
candidly concluded that instead o f 
assisting toward expiation and 
m erit, suffe ring can a lso furnish 
occasio n for new faults.45 Surely 
there must be a midground between 
the exaltatio n of human suffering 
as glorious, and the attitude ofte~ 
lived by today that it is the ulti-
m ate evil , re flected in the automa-
tic gulp fro m the aspirin bottle at 
the mere hint o f a headache. 
The Ethics of 
Voluntary Euthanasia 
Had this paper been presented 
fiftee n years ago, its gist almost 
necessarily would have been an in-
quiry into the ethics o f euthanasia. 
But in the meantime such inquiry. 
acutely engendered a t one stage by 
the running debate . between G Ian-
ville Williams46 and his o pponent s. 
has been richly productive. My 
viewpoint - that whatever the dim-
inutio n o f mo ral re prehensibility 
by the fac ts of a given case,_ eutha-
nasia in principle is une th1cal as 
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we ll as illegal killing - has air, 
been essentially presented by 
law pro fessor colleagues Yale 
misar,47 Charles E. Rice,48 and 
vid Daube,49 and by Norman 
Jo hn Stevas. M.P .. 50 and othL 
T he refore. I tarry o nly brie fl y 
the ethi cs of voluntary e utha n 
itself. that is, the deliberate, affi 1 
tive, intentional act of effecti1 
mercy death. 
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My o nly serious issue with ' t )-
fessor Kamisar concerns his t v . 
"Some Non-Re ligio us Views Ag: s l 
Proposed 'Me rcy-Killing' Le1. a-
lion". Supporting the distinc t n, 
he says: " I leave the religious _a u-
me nts (for opposing euthanasia o 
the theologians."52 True, the inj c-
tion o f Exodusf>3 "The innocent •d 
just ma n thou s halt not pur o 
death'' a rguably is a re ligious . 1r 
perhaps more precisely, a theo i ~~­
cal reason, fo r opposing e uthan <· , .. 
He who is Lo rd of Life is also ·i-
mately Lord of the time o f De h. 
But except as Scripture or e " a-
potations therefrom, or from e-
ceived C hristian traditio n ,· fo n u-
late religious reasons for oppo' 1g 
e uthanasia, in what way do the · e-
lig ious" reasons differ from 1e 
" no n-re ligious" or utilita rian on· <>? 
A warning comes to mind : 
It is a great mistake to let poepl, 
know that moral issues involve re-
ligio n. If you talk about religion yo• 
migh t just as well talk about po litic ' 
Everyone agrees that politics and r..: 
ligion are a matter of opinio~o. Yo u 
can take your pick ... 
Let this be clear. When we talk 
abo ut moral problems we are not 
talking about religious beliefs - w~ich 
we can take or leave. Stealing, lymg. 
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killing , fornicating would be wrong 
even if no church C{)ndemned them. 
Hijacking aircraft , tossing bombs into 
crowded shopping centers and selling 
drugs to your c hildren ·are no t sins 
mentioned in the bible. Nor is eutha-
nasia. So keep religion u ut of this .. _:;.~ 
I perhaps belie the wisdom implicit 
in the foregoing when I reveal that 
the writer is the Archbishop of 
Westminis ter, Jo hn Cardinal Hee-
nan. 
Are not the fo llowing reasons for 
opposing voluntary eu thanasia 
both "re li g io us" and " no n-re li-
gious"? Ascertainment of a sick 
person's abiding desire for death 
and persistent a nd true intention 
affirmatively to seek it , is intrin-
sically diffic ult and o ften impossi-
ble. The difficulties inhere in ill-
ness with its pain and distraction , 
and are compounded by narcotics 
and analgesics. Anything like the 
legal standard for voluntariness in 
other con texts, for example for 
criminal confessions, would be hard 
to achieve. W ould minors of knowl-
edgeable age and discretion be al-
lowed to elect it , and with or with-
out parental consent? A decisio n 
made before illness to elect e utha-
nasia conditionally. would have 
morbid aspects a nd would leave 
lingering do ubts as to the cont inuity 
of intention , especially with inter-
vening coma. Euthanasia, if legally 
formalized by procedural restric-
tions, would threaten to conve rt 
the sick room into an adjudicative 
tribuna l. The conseque nces of re-
quired decisions and procedures 
might be harshe r for the fam ily. 
especially young children, than fo r 
the dying pe rson. If left essen-
tially to the discre tion of the physi-
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cian, administration of euthanasia 
would be as variable as the tremen-
dous variat ion in medical compe-
tence. But not even the best physi-
cian is infallible and mistakes, nec-
essarily irretrievable, would have 
the odious flavor of avoidable trag-
edy. Moreover, the history of sci-
ence and medicine increasingly 
demonstrates that yesterday's in -
curable disease is subject matter of 
today's ro utine treatment. Even " in-
curable" cancer is sometimes sub-
ject to remissions.55 In medicine, 
as in life itself, there is no true 
hopelessness. 
Euthanasia would threaten the 
patient-physician relationship; con-
fidence might give way to suspicion. 
Would a patient who had intended 
to revoke his declaration for eutha-
nasia have faith that his second 
word would be heeded? Can the 
physician , historic battler for life, 
become an affirmative agent of 
death without jeopardizing the trust 
of his dependents? Indeed, would 
not his new function of active eu-
tha nator tend psychologically to 
underm ine the physician's acclima-
tion to the historic mandate, " I 
place before you life and death. 
Therefore, c hoose li fe. "?56 And 
what would acceptance of the psy-
chology o f e uthanasia do to the 
peace of mind of the mass of the 
so-called incurables. 
Lastly, how lo ng would we have 
voluntary euthanasia without sur-
rendering to pressures for the in-
voluntary? Wo uld no t the pressures 
be .truly ine xorable? Merely to ask 
suc h questions and state these 
points seems to belie a dichotomy 
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between " re ligious" and " nGm-reli-
gious" reasons for opposing volun-
tary euthanasia. I see essentially 
human reasons.s7 
There is no Obligation 
"Officiously to Keep Alive" 
the Dying 
If humor may be brought to con-
side ration even of these grim prob-
lems - and perhaps the more seri-
o us the problem, the more helpful 
the light touch - I may be par-
do ned for commencing this part 
with the words of Arthur Hugh 
C lo ugh who apparently wrote in 
light vein: 
Though shalt not kill, but need'st 
not strive Officiously to keep alive .68 
I submit that it is about as clear 
as human answers can be in such 
matte rs that there is no moral ob-
ligation to keep alive by artificial 
means the Elizabeth Schell Holt-
Hartfords of the world whose lives 
na ture would forfeit and who , in 
na ture's terms, wish to die , or in 
C hristian terms, wish to pass over 
to the promised land. I . submit 
further that the law in no manner 
seeks to set at nought this mora l 
truth . The moral idea was put this 
way by Pius XII when in November 
1957 he a nswered questions for the 
Inte rnational Congress of Anes-
thesiologists: 
Natural reason and Christian mo r· 
als say that man (and whoever is e n-
trusted with the task o f taking care 
o f his fellowman) has the right and 
the duty in case of se rio us illness to 
take the necessary treatment for the 
preservatio n o f life and health . T his 
duty that one has toward himself. 
toward God. toward the human com-
munity. and in most cases toward cer· 
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tain determined persons. de rives fr 
well ordered charity. fro m submis'• 
to the Creator, from social justice . 
even fro m strict justice, as well 
fro m devotion toward o ne's famih 
But normally one is he ld to 
only o rd inary means - accordinl 
ci rcumstances of persons, pia· 
times, and culture - that is to 
means that do not invo lve any gr 
burden for oneself or another. A m· 
strict obligation would be too bur 
some fo r most men and would rer: r 
the attainment of the higher, m •: 
important good too difficult. L 
health, all temporal activities art ·1 
fact subordinated to spiritual er 
O n the other hand, o ne is not for 
den to take more than the stn . 11 
necessary steps to preserve life J 
health, as long as he dOes not fau n 
some more ser ious duty.59 
Although Pius XI£ did nol. be-
lieve, use the expression ·· .t ra-
ordinary means" it has becomt -:us-
tomary to capture his thoug' in 
the shorthand phrase "disti n tion 
between o rdinary and extn , 1rdi· 
nary means." It is a convenient ·on-
densation but, as with short n. mes 
generally , may mislead unless , lari-
fied . For one thing , there seer:·s to 
be considerable difference be tv. een 
the significance typically given the 
"ordinary and extraordinary mtans" 
distinction by physicians on the 
one hand , and moral theologwns, 
on the other. Physicia ns seem to 
take the distinction as equivalent to 
that between customary and unu-
sual means as a matter o f medical 
prac tice. Theologians pour into the 
distinctio n all factors relevant to 
appropriate moral decision how· 
ever non-medical they may be: the 
patient's philosophic preference, 
the conditions of the fami ly in-
cluding the economic facts, the 
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relative hardships on a realistic 
basis of one course · o f conduct as 
contrasted with another.60 E ven 
means that are "ordinary" from the 
viewpoint of medical practice, may 
be "extraordinary" in the to tality 
of life's dilemmas. 
Take the case of a three-year old 
child, one of whose eyes had al-
ready been removed surgically be-
cause of malignant tumor. The 
other eye later became infected in 
the same way, and medical progno-
sis offered only the dilemma of 
either certain death without fur-
ther surgery or a considerable prob-
ability of saving the child's life by 
a second ophthalmectomy. From 
the medical viewpoint, doubtless 
such surgery represents an ordinary 
means of saving life. I take it to be 
the prevailing theological view that 
(putting aside the additional prob-
lem of one acting for another -
the father for the three-year old) 
one is no t obliged to save his life 
when that entails a lifetime of total 
blindness. In other words, under 
the circums tances the surgery 
would be an extraordinary, and 
morally not required, way of sav-
ing Iife.st 
Thus an artificial means, how-
ever ordinary in medical practice, 
may be mora lly extraordinary and 
not obligatory. Also, it may be 
non-obligatory, even though o rdi-
nary, beca use it is likely to be use-
less. (I speak now o f arllji'cial 
means, such as surgery . and no t of 
natural things as furnishing o f food . 
drink and the means o f rest). To 
save the convenient dis tinc tio n be-
tween ordinary and extraordina ry 
means, while at the same time pro-
November, 1973 
moting its accuracy, the theolo-
gians have wisely incorpora ted into 
the defini tio ns qua lifications nec-
essitated by such cases as the three-
year old's, as well as the common-
sense requirement that an artificial 
means to be obligatory must be of 
potential usefulness. Thus: 
Ordinary means are all medicines, 
treatments, and operations, which of· 
fer a reasonable hope o f benefit and 
which can be obta ined and used with-
out excessive expense, pain, or other 
inconvenience. 
Extraordinary means are all medi-
cines, treatments, and o perations, 
which cannot be obtained o r used 
without excessive expense, pain , or 
other inconvenience, or which. if 
used . would not o ffer a reasonable 
hope of benefit.62 
Of course the physician cannot 
be blamed for emphasizing the 
purely medical considerations in 
his appraisal of the appropriate-
ness of the means for staving off 
death. Necessarily this is the trend 
of his training and competence, per-
haps sometimes fortified by the po-
tentiality of malpractice liability. 
On a practical level the reco ncilia-
tion of the physicia n's and moral-
ist 's views on extraordinuy means 
is in the reality that, after a ll , the 
decisio n as to how ha rd and far lO 
push to keep life going by artific ial 
means, is ultimate ly the patient's. 
not the physician's. That is, the 
physic ian may be legally obligated 
to proffer what is c usto mary medi-
cal practice altho ugh the patient 
may be morally e ntitled to rejec t it 
as extraordinary.63 Conversely, pre-
s umably the patient is e ntitled to 
have , in situations whe re tha t is his 
final hope because lesser e fforts 
afford no promise. means that the 
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physician regards as medically unu-
sual or ex traordinary - although I 
sho uld like to qualify this a mo ment 
later from the moral viewpoint. 
While discussing physicians' par-
tic ipation in the life-death decision-
al process, it is pertinent to note 
an apparent tendency among them 
to regard as more significant , and 
more hazardous, the stopping of 
extraordinary means compared to 
failure to start them in the first 
place.64 Thus, there is more hesi-
tan cy to turn off the resuscitato r 
th an to decide originally not to turn 
it on . This distinction is I think 
from the oral viewpoint , only a 
quibble. Indeed, might there not 
be more justification in ceasing 
afte r a failing effort has been made. 
then in not trying in the first place? 
The medical attitude in this reg~rd 
seems more psychologically than 
ra tio nally based . Perhaps the phy-
sician has been excessively influ-
enced by the common law's historic 
distinction between "action" and 
"inaction." From the legal view-
point it is worth no ting tha t Pro-
fessor Kamisar's careful research 
fa iled to reveal by 1958 a single 
case where there had been an in-
dictment, let alone a convictio n, for 
a " mercy-killing" by omission ;65 and 
I know of none since. It seems 
legally far-fetched to convert "omis-
sion·· into "commission" by the 
me re fac t that the machine is turned 
off when it fails to be effective , 
rather than not turned on in the 
first place.66 Civil liability of course 
is something else; but is there really 
much danger of malpractice be-
cause a physician ceases to con-
tinue to use an apparently hopeless 
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medical technique, just because e 
has tried it out? Certainly not 'iO 
where the patient declines furt' ~r 
use; and when he is beyond per~ n-
al decision , because for exam le 
un consc io us , c learance fron a 
spouse or family member seem. to 
help , although as previously nc ~d 
it is hard to find a juridical b ·~is 
for letting one adult dec ide vr 
another.67 Estoppel might becon · a 
rele vant defense in a sui t for wn •lg-
ful death. 
Can one wander through he 
wards of the aged dying, obseP •ng 
the Elizabeth Schell H9lt-Hartfo ds. 
hearing the murmured prayers · '-e t 
me pass over," without reali. ing 
that o ften the frenetic effort~ to 
resuscitate or just to keep g• .ng 
are a n affro nt to human digni ty In 
all truth the ir objective is no as 
much the prolongation of life <~> of 
the process of dying. Can one d• ubt 
that the Master Observer of the 
human condition has percei ved the 
moral as well as psychological re-
ality when in his King Lear he put it: 
V ex not his ghost: 0, let him pa~,· 
he hates him T hat would upon th.: 
rack o f this tough world Stretch hi111 
out longer.66 
Needless to say, I now put a.;ide 
the additional and relatively new 
problem, not without moral impli-
cations of its own, o f keeping a 
body pronounced dead functioning 
in pa rt essentially as an organ bank 
for transplantation purposes.69 
Since the case for no t stretch ing 
out longer seems so self-evident, 
how e xplain the countervailing mo· 
tives and practices of so many phy· 
sicians and families? In the case of 
the former, is it sometimes sheer 
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p~ofessional pride, human ego, the 
thrill of the game, perhaps akin to 
the lawyer's will to win? As to the 
families, maybe one typically need 
look no further than to the trauma-
tic shock of threatened death of 
a beloved. But is a sense of guilt 
over past neglect, rather than love, 
sometimes at least a partial explana-
tion? In such an area one should not 
speak abstractly; each threatened 
death is unique and very personal. 
Who, however much in agreement 
with what I have just said, would 
not applaud the most persistent and 
heroic efforts imaginable to succG>r 
the youthful victim of a casualty 
such as an automobile accident? 
Who would deny that in such a case 
every intendment of the presump-
tion of the will to live should be in-
dulged by the physicians a nd all 
concerned? 
Perhaps these frene tic effo rts to 
keep going the earthly life of the 
aged that nature wo uld forfeit go 
hand in hand with the mate rialism 
of. modern society. The witty Hi-
latre Belloc observed: 
Of old when men lay sick and sorely 
tried. 
The doctors gave them physic and 
they died. 
But here's a happier age, for now we 
know 
Both how to make men sick and 
keep them so!70 
The willingness to le t pass those 
who are ready and wish to pass 
seems as much an act of Christian 
faith as of reco ncilia tio n with na-
ture's way. In this sense perhaps 
there is as much of Christian hope-
fulness about death as of pagan 
acceptance of dissolution in the 
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poet's invocat.ion of the concept o l 
conquering "the fever called 'Liv-
ing. ' "71 
That it is permissible to withhold 
extraordinary means to me seems 
so clear tha t future discussion is 
like ly to focus instead on whether 
and unde r what circ umstances 
there is a duty to do so. Recall 
the ending of the quoted allocu-
tion of Pius XII: "One is not for-
bidden to take more than the 
stric tly necessary steps to preserve 
life and health , as long as he does 
no t fail in some more serious 
duty."72 Doubtless that is the start-
ing point of the relevant analysis 
and doubtless, too, the decision 
typically is for the patient, not the 
physician. But what are the more 
serious duties that should prepon-
derate fo r example in the mind of 
the head of the family , over ex-
travagant efforts to preserve his 
own life? That profligate expense 
may deprive the children of educa-
tion, certainly seems relevant. Hard-
ly less so is the mental torture that 
may be imposed on the family by 
indefinite prolongation o f the phy-
sical dissolution of its head. And 
possibly, if medical facilities and 
services increasingly become of 
lesser availability in relation to the 
demand, society's needs may some 
day be held to supersede the per-
sonal requests fo r extraordinary 
means even by those financially 
able to pay. 
No sooner as one has thus spo ken 
of the right, even possibly the duty, 
of ~ithholding extraordinary means 
than he wonders if his message 
tends to undermine the medical 
professional's proudest boast and 
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happiest claim - its historic bull-
dogged defense of human life. For 
in result , even when no t in motiva-
tion , there is more than professional 
pride and human ego in the physi-
cian's strugglings. As Gerald K elley, 
S.J. put it: "By working on even the 
smallest hope doctors often pro-
duce wonderful results , whereas a 
defeatist att itude would in a certain 
se nse 'turn back the clock' of medi-
cal progress. Also, this professional 
ideal is a sure preventive of an 
e utha nasian mentality."73 
Our last , and hardest question , 
essentially becomes: Is the dis-
tinction between letting die, and 
killing, sound enough to preclude 
the euthanasian mentality? 
The Distinction between Killing, 
and Letting Die, Continues to be 
Viable, Valid and Meaningful 
If it is permissible to let die a 
patient direly afflicted and sorely 
suffering, why is it wrong affirma-
tively to help him die with loving 
purpose and kindly means? The 
question poses stark challenge to 
philosopher, theologian, ethician , 
moralist, physician, lawyer and all 
persons of good will whether or not 
re ligiously oriented. 
Let us put onto the scales our 
conclusions to the moment, on the 
one side the permissible things, on 
the o ther those forbidden. Note that 
on each side there is a negative and 
an affirmative thing. It is permissi-
ble to withhold ex traord inary 
means, and also to g ive drugs to 
relieve pain even to the point o f 
causing death. It is no t permissible 
to withhold ordinary means, or 
affirmatively and inte ntiona lly to 
cause death. 
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All of us, specifically Ia'\ ·rs, 
are under injunction to avoi( .he 
hypocrisy that inflicts on ma1 tnd 
unnecessary burdens. One . ca not 
daily face in law school cl ses 
the youth of the country wit )Ut 
perceiving that whatever may 1ve 
happened to parts of the Decal! ue, 
hypocrisy remains a n acknowle · ~ed 
and detested sin. Will o ur d i~ nc-
tions withstand indictment ~l' de-
ception or sham? Can we 1 -;ist 
upon them without being L po-
crites? 
Certainly the fact that ou1 lis-
tinctions are fine does no of 
itself condemn them, ·Biology. lsy-
chology and morality, like life 
itself, are filled with close ( tes-
tions, narrow definitions, and ine 
distinctions.74 T he margin be-
tween pain and pleasure rna be 
as imprecise as that between ve 
and hate.75 Nor is universal ·er-
tainty and equality of applic< ion 
of principle to the facts of ( 1ses 
necessarily a test of the princil'le's 
validity. Appellate judges are 
wont to say that much must be left 
to the d iscretion of trial j uc~es, 
and moralists must concur that 
much must be left to the judgment 
of those who apply principle to 
hard facts. As Gerald Vann , O.P. 
put it: 
Moral action presupposes scient ' 
but is itself an an, the an of livin!'· 
Moral science concerns itself fir't 
o f all with general princ iples, as in· 
deed being a science it must ; but the 
subjec t of morality is not human ac-
tion in general, but this or that human 
ac tion, in this or that set of circum-
stances, and emanating from this or 
that personality. Hence the fact. 
remarked upon by Aristotle, that 
ethics cannot be an e xact science. 
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There is no set of ready·made rules 
to be applied to eachindividual case ; 
the principles have to be applied , but 
this is the function of the virtue of 
prudence, and with prudence as with 
an, as Maritain points out , each new 
case is really a new and unique case, 
each action is a unique action. What 
constitutes the goodness of an action 
is the relation of the mind not to 
moral principles in the abstract but 
to this individual moral action. Hence 
an essential element of quasi-intuition 
is at least implicit in every willed a nd 
chosen action.76 
Incidentally , we common law 
lawyers have admirable instrum ents 
by which to effectuate the moral-
ist's acknowledgment of the nec-
essity of accommodation of prin-
ciple to fact. We have at the intel-
lectual o r formal level the institu-
tions of Equity and on the pragmatic 
level trial by jury. True, the accom-
modation by a jury may be radical 
indeed, as Dryden observed cen-
turies ago: 
Who laughs but once to see an ass 
Mumbling to make the co urse-
grained thistles pass, 
Would laugh again to see a jury chaw 
The thistles o f an unpalatable law.77 
My only point in passing is that with 
such means of accommodation, I 
doubt that we need formal provi-
sions of law to mitigate the poten-
tial harshness in applying homicide 
principles to mercy deaths. Wheth-
er or not we do, is certainly a legi-
timate and open question ; some will 
argue for statutes authorizing lesser 
penalties in case of euthanasia, as 
in Norway.78 Personally. I fear that 
formal provision fo r mitigation 
might do more harm educationally 
by way of undermining the distinc-
tion between letting die and killing, 
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than good substantively.79 This of 
course presupposes the validity of 
the distinction, to which we now 
turn . 
Daniel Maquire in Commonweal 
recently concluded: "It can be said 
that in certain cases, direct positive 
intervention to bring on death may 
be morally permissible ... The ab-
solutist stance opposed to this con-
clusion must assume the burden of 
proof - an impossible burden , I 
believe."80 This conclusion on 
burden of proof will I think astound 
the proceduralist, ce rtainly one of 
historical orientation , as much as 
the moralist. For centuries medical 
e thics has drawn sharp and firm 
distinction between "positive ac-
tion" and "calculated benign neg-
lect," to use Maquire's own terms.81 
T he theologian's principle of dou-
ble e ffect is an ancie nt one. In the 
face of the historical realities, why, 
suddenly, this reversal of the bur-
den of proof? Hardly because to-
day's logic is sharper; the principle 
of double effect has been reexam-
ined and criticized by able minds 
for generations. Do the new psy-
chological insights justify such re-
versal of the field? Quite the con-
trary, I submit. 
The principle of double effect has 
four criteria. Let us apply them to 
the distinction perhaps the hardest 
of all to sustain, that between the 
administration of drugs to kill, on 
the one ha nd, and the administra-
tion to relieve pain even though 
death may be hastened, on the 
other. The crite ria are: 
(i) the act itself must be morally 
good, or at least neutral; 
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(ii) the purpose must be to achieve 
the good consequence, the bad con-
sequence be ing o nly a side effec t : 
(iii) the good effect must not be 
achieved by way of the bad, but both 
must result fro m the same act ; 
(iv) the bad result must not be so 
serious as to outweigh the advantage 
o f the good result.82 
Admittedly application of these 
c riteria may produce nuances so 
delicate that the decision of o ne 
able and conscientious mind may 
be at odds with another equally 
able and conscientious. Conced-
ing arguendo that a principle of 
such ambivalent potential may have 
logical deficiencies, is not the ulti-
mate question of its justification 
not one of dry logic but of its psy-
chological validity? Let us suppose 
a physician, faced with his patie nt's 
into lerable pain unmitigable by ~es­
ser doses and his urgent plea fo r 
relief, decides on a dose of analge-
sic likely to cause death. (You may 
substitute "certainly to cause death" 
if you wish, but I would remind that 
in the physiological realities, it 
may always remain doubtful wheth-
er the pain itself might have been 
as death-producing.) 
Contrast the attitude and manner 
whic h the motive of relieving pain 
engenders, with those likely con-
sequent upon a grim determination 
to kill. If the purpose explicitly 
were to kill , would there not be 
profound difference in the very way 
one would grasp the syringe, the 
look in the eye, the words that 
might be spoken or withheld , those 
subtle admixtures of fear and ho pe 
that haunt the death-bed scene? 
And would not the consequences 
o f the difference be compounded 
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almost geometrically at least ~or 
the physician as he killed one ' ch 
patient after another? And wh< of 
the repercussions of the diffen .ce 
on the nurses and hospital · a .!n-
dants?83 How long would the < al-
ity and attitude of mercy sut ve 
death-intending conduct? The ne 
between the civilized and sa \. .ge 
in men is fine enough witr Jut 
jeopardizing it by euthanasia. lis-
tory teaches the line is main r 1n· 
able under the principle of dot 1le 
effect ; it might well not be undt · a 
regime of direct intentional kill 1g. 
Moreover, I fear the effect~ on 
the family if law, sometimes he 
great teacher of o ur soc iety, \1. re 
to start to teach the legitimac~ of 
direct killing. I am indebted to 
my colleague David Daube f,, a 
telling illustration of the vali· ·· ry 
of this concern. There was at )x-
ford one of the great historian!' of 
the century who was to tally p< ra-
lyzed up to the shoulde rs, with all 
that implies by way of dependence 
and suffering. A loving wife and 
family nurtured and sustained him, 
at no mean cost, of course. The 
visits of this profound scholar and 
scintilating conversationalist to All 
Souls College were a weekly de-
light to all who could sha re the cnf-
fee hour with him, even as he sipped 
with a tube from the cup. Immobile 
in his wheel chair, he nevertheless 
gave a final memorable lecture. 
Under a regime of euthanasia's le).! i-
timacy, would not cultivated, sensi-
tive, and selfless spirits such as this 
feel an obligation to s pare their 
families the burden? Certainly in 
this case, as Professor Da ube con-
cludes, scholarship, family life and 
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All Souls College might have paid 
a heavy price in an euthanasiac 
regime for an act that might have 
been coerced by a sense o f obli-
gation.84 To the sensitive and self-
less especially, what the law would 
permit might well become the mea-
sure of obligation to family and 
friends.ss 
There is no time to wend ou r 
way back to the great natural law 
philosophers suc h as Heracli tus and 
Cicero. In any event I claim no 
special ·competence to lead the 
trek, as has recently my colleague 
Ehrenzweig in his usua lly profound 
and comprehensive way, albeit in 
uncqnventional context.86 I cannot 
help wonder, though •. whether the 
principal mischief with suc h life-
interfering proposals as euthanasia 
is their undue deprecation of the 
importance of the natural order 
in human affairs. As a principal 
heresy of the 19th Century was that 
progress lay in human domination 
of the environment, perhaps the 
heresy of this century will prove 
to be that biological evolution must 
be dominated by human will .B7 Cer-
tainly we must hope that the free-
dom and integrity of the human 
person will not be as much ravaged 
and stripped as have been the for-
ests and fields and waters of the 
world. As a physician puts it: 
We are possessed with a technologic 
spirit in which power over nature is 
the predominant theme. We ignore 
the fact that there is an intrinsic de-
spair and disparity in looking to tech-
nology for a solution. We forget that 
our problem is not to master nature, 
but to nurture nature. We also forget 
that technological achievements are, 
at best, ameliorative, and, at wo rst, 
dehumanizing. sa 
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The additional dilemmas that 
a regime of mercy deaths would 
impose - such problems as ascer-
tainment of true and abiding con-
sent - would seem of themselves 
reasons for avoiding the creation 
of more unlighted paths.89 Is not 
the preferred choice continuing 
progress in the alleviation of pain 
and loving care of the Elizabeth 
Schell Holt-Hartfords among our 
neighbors, rather than killing? We 
are only mortal, and in this area a 
gra nd attempt to restructure the 
natural o rder seems more danger-
ous than hopeful. Nature can be 
harsh and c ruel, but it is never 
corrupt. Human will can be all 
three. 
Perhaps after a ll I have discov-
ered rapport with at least one song 
the you ng folks sing, ·'Que sera, 
sera ." T here are some things tha t 
would be tha t we'd better let be . 
Conclusion 
The distinction between affirma-
tive killing, and allowing one to 
d ie according to nature's order with-
out extraordinary effort to "stretch 
him out longer," continues to be 
a valid, viable and meaningful dis-
tinction.oo T he line of demarcation 
may be fine , but so are many other 
lines that men must draw in their 
fallible perception and limited wis-
dom. Application of the principled 
d istinctio n between ordinary and 
extraordinary means of prolonging 
life occasions difficulties, but hard-
ly any different in quality from vari-
ous other decisions in applying a 
general principle to particular 
facts. The distinction between the 
use of drugs to kill, and their use 
to alleviate pain even though death 
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may thereby be hastened, is like-
wise valid. 
When the question becomes one 
for the legal system, fortunately 
our law has time-tested devices for 
accommodating principle and facts, 
notably the jury. It seems hardly 
necessary or wise for us to attempt 
articulation of formal legal stan-
dards of lesser liability in cases of 
euthanasia than for other criminal 
homicides in the manner of Nor-
wegian law. The harm of the edu-
cative effects of formalization of 
lesser penalties for euthanasia, 
probably would outweigh the values 
thereby gained by way of certainty 
of legal consequence and surer 
guarantee of equal protection of 
the law. 
Our era is one that seeks, and 
often for good reason, a constant 
expansion of a juridical order in 
human affairs. But not every human 
relationship stands to profit from 
complete juridicalization, as witness 
pare nt-child relations. Besides the 
force of law, there is also the king-
dom o f love. Perhaps the best we 
can do is to work for the right of 
our Elizabe th Schell Holt-Hartfo rds 
peacefully to die when their time 
comes in the embrace of the ir ne igh-
bors and fellow members of that 
kingdom. 
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79. Compare Silving, ·'E uthanasi• A 
Study in Comparative C rimina l Law. 103 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 350 , 352-54 (1 954); "R ent 
. Dec isio ns,'' 34 Notre Dame Law. 460 464 
(1959). See no te 77, supra. 
80. Note 44 supra, 426. 
81. P . Ram sey, no te 34 supra, 118-11) 
82. Death Warrant, 80. For a conten•por-
a ry discussion of the princ iple of de <Jble 
e ffect, see C. C urran, Medicine and Mr ·als. 
5-7 (Corpus Papers 1970) . 
83. It seems perhaps iron ical th at . ' ith 
permissive abortion , it may be not so n 1ch 
logical ana lyses as the aesthe tic sen,c.:-
e.g. nurses· and hospita l a ttendants· rc.:' ul· 
sion a t viewing the Mond ay morning ,tfte r· 
math o f the week-end's abortio ns- that 
shocks us into real ization o f what is l) t ll ng 
on. See Louisell . note 69 supra a t 21 n . 69: 
Doube. ··Legal Problems in Medica l Ad-
va nce," 6 Israe li L. Rev. I. 2 ( 197 1). 
84. Daube, no te 49 supra, 1336. Profes~or 
Dyck in his paper, no te 2 supra asks: 
Why are these distinc tions (between 
pe rmitting to die and causing death) im· 
po rtant in instances where permitting 
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to die or causing death have the same ef-
fect - namely, . that a life is shorte ned? 
In both instances there is a failu re to try 
to prolong the life o f o ne who is dying. 
It is at this point that one must see why 
consequential reasoning is in itself too 
narrow, and why it is impo rtant also not 
to limit the d iscussio n of euthanasia 
to the immediate re lationship between 
a single patient and a si ngle physic ia n. 
Answering, he states in pa rt: 
. .. If a dying person chooses for the 
sake of relieving pain drugs adm iniste red 
in potent dose , this is not primarily a n 
act of shortening life, altho ugh it may 
have that effec t, but it is a cho ice o f how 
the patient wishes to live while dying. 
Similarly , if a patient chooses to fo rego 
medical interventions that would have 
the effect of prolo nging his o r her dying 
without in any way prom ising release 
fro m death , this a lso i.s a choice as 
to what is the most meaningfu l way to 
spend the remainder o f life, however 
short that may be. The choice to use 
drugs to relieve pain and the choice no t 
to use medical measures that canno t 
promise a cure for one's dying a re no 
different in princ iple from the c ho ices 
we make throughout our lives as to how 
much we will rest, how hard we will wo rk , 
how little and how much medical inte r-
vention we will seek o r tolerate and the 
like. 
85. See Death Warrant, 83-84 ; J. Dede k, 
note 14 supra, 137. Compare the euthanasiac 
death o f Sigmund Freud as to ld by his phy-
sician, Max Sci'ur. Freud: Living and Dy ing, 
(1972) . Freud's cancer of the oral cavity 
was discovered in April , 1923. when he was 
about 67 years old. Schur became his per-
sona l physic ian in 1928 and served until 
Freud's death in 1939, both in Vienna and 
London. (p. 347) When he firs t e ngaged 
Schur, Freud o bta ined the promise o f eu-
thanasia: 
... Mentioning o nly in a ra the r genera l 
way "some unfo rtunate expe riences with 
your predecessors," he expressed the ex-
pectation that he wo uld a lways be to ld 
the truth and nothing but the truth. M y 
response must have reassured him that I 
meant to keep such a pro mise. He than 
added, looking searc hingly a t me: 
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·'Versprechen Sie mir auch noch: Wenn 
es mal so weit ist, werden Sie mic h nic ht 
unnotig qualen lassen ." ("Pro mise me 
one more thing: tha t when the time 
comes, you won't let me suffer unnec-
essarily.' ') All this was said with the 
utmost simplic ity, without a tr<tce of 
pathos, but also with complete dete r-
mina tion. We shook hands at this point. 
(p . 408.) 
Thus doctor and pa tient were under eu-
thanasiac commitment · during approxi-
mate ly the last 11 years of Fre ud's life. 
Schur relates the fina l scene: 
On the following day, Septe mber 2 1, 
while I was sitting at his beside, Freud 
took my hand and said to me: "Le iber 
Schur, Sie e rinnern sich wo hl an unser 
erstes Gesprach. Sie haben mir damals 
versprochen mich nic ht im Stiche zu 
lassen wenn es so weit ist. Das ist jetzt 
nur noch Qualerei und hat ke inen Sin n 
mehr." (My dear Schur, you certainly 
remember our fi rst ta lk . You promised 
me then not to fo rsa ke me when my 
time comes. Now it's no thing but torture 
and makes no sense any more.'") 
I indicated that I had no t fo rgotten my 
pro mise. He sighed with relief, held my 
hand for a moment longer, and said : 
" lch danke Ihnen'" ("I thank you"), and 
afte r a mo ment of hesitation he added : 
"Sagen Sie es der Anna" ("T ell Anna 
abo ut this"). All this was said witho ut a 
trace of emotionality o r self-pity, and 
with full consciousness of reality. 
I informed Anna o f o ur conversatio n. 
as Freud had asked . When he was again 
in agony. I gave him a hypodermic o f 
two centigrams of mo rphine. He soon 
fe lt re lief and fe ll into a peaceful sleep. 
The expression of pa in and suffe ring was 
gone. I repeated this d ose afte r about 
twelve ho urs. Fre ud was obviously so 
close to the end of his reserves that he 
lapsed into a coma and did not wake up 
again . He died at 3:00 A .M. o n Septem-
ber 23. 1939. 
Freud had said in his "Tho ughts for 
the Times on War and Death": 
. T owards the ac tua l pe rson who has 
died we adopt a special a ttitude : 
something like admira tio n fo r some-
one who has accom plished a very 
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e utha nasiac regime might e ngender among 
the e lderly (or those in the process of be· 
coming elderly - as we a ll are) have no 
exact counterpart in the case of abortion. 
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Kenned y Memo rial Hospi tal v. f ton, 
58 NJ. 576, 279 A2d 670 (197 1). In , told-
ing the subjection o f an adult Jel Jh's 
Witness. who had sustained severe i 1ries 
in an automobile accident, to a lood 
tra nsfusio n necessary to save her h the 
Court pe r Weintraub, Ch. J. said: "II ems 
correct to say there is no constitt onal 
right to choose to die.'' Replying the 
patient's contention that there is a diff, ·nee 
be tween passively submiuing to de<J t and 
actively seeking it , the Court sai• "If 
the State may interrupt one mode <• self· 
destructio n (suicide) it may wi th equ au· 
tho ri ty interfere with the o ther." It ad <)WI· 
edges that "It is arguably different hen 
a n individual , overtake n by illness, d tdes 
to le t it run a fatal course." Pretern• ting 
the question of the free exerc ise of re ton, 
it seems unfo rtunate that the Court · par· 
ently did not confront more direct!· the 
extent o f the obligation to use art• ·.:ial 
means to sustain life . 
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Confere nce. H e writes a weekly 
syndicated column for the National 
Catholic News Feature Se rvice and 
has written books and articles re lat-
ing to marriage and the family. 
During the past three to five 
years, there has been a continual 
effort to revise and update the mar-
riage laws thro ughout the Un ited 
States. In too many cases this has 
become simply an effo rt to replace 
current divorce laws with the so-
called no-fault statute, a nd in many 
other sta tes, the more importa nt 
aspects of domestic relati ons law 
receive less attention beca use of 
the debate about no-fault divorce. 
No-fault divorce laws will receive 
increasing public atte ntion for the 
next few years, principally because 
some type of no-fa ult legislation 
has been introduced in several 
States and has already been adopted 
in some. Thus it is worth consider-
ing this specific legal proposal and 
the anticipated effec ts it will have 
in terms of marriage counseling 
and the physician's ro le. 
November, 1973 
A model no-fault divorce statute 
has been developed by the National 
Confe rence of Commissioners on 
Un iform State Laws. The model 
sta tute was referred by the Ameri-
can Ba r Association to its Family 
Law Section in 1971. After careful 
study, the Family Law Section rec-
omme nded that the ABA withhold 
endorsement of the model law pend-
ing more extensive study, and as o f 
the February, 1972, meeting of the 
ABA, no e ndo rsement was given. 
No-fault divorce is looked upo n 
as a radical departure fro m the 
past system. There are no grounds 
for d ivorce o the r than the irre-
trievable breakdown of the mar-
riage. T here is no necessity to de-
termine who is g uilty fo r the brea k-
down of the marriage. but simply 
the necessity to verify that it has 
irre trievably broken down. Most 
ofte n, th is is ascertained from the 
affirmatio n by the couple. 
T he basic diffic ulties of the break-
down theory are: 
I. Establishing objective criteria 
that can be applied to indicate the 
breakdown of marriage. 
2. Establishing some manageable 
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